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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Order Denying the Appellant's Motion for
Reconsideration, Order Regarding all Pending Motions, and Judgment, file-stamped in
the above-entitled matter on the 10th day of August, 2012, the 11 ih day of July, 2012, and
the 28th day of September, 2012, respectively.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On or about August 3, 2006, Appellant, Wally Kay Schultz, (hereinafter referred
to as "Schultz"), was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, as is set forth in
Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Minidoka. Said case was set for trial at a later date, which was vacated
because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4, 2007.
Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a unified sentence of five (5)
years, which unified sentence was comprised of a mimmum (fixed) period of confinement
of five ( 5) years, followed by an indeterminate period of custody of 0 years. Schultz
received credit for time served in the amount of 3 76 days. (R. pp. 118-124.)
Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003,
certain improprieties occurred in at

one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp.

9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark

- l -

Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab
Improvement Manager, i\fatthew Garnette, regarding Skyler Anderson. Garnette
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of
controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing.
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection
of this practice. Mr. Anderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four (4)
occasions. (R. p. 138.)
Based on this information, Schultz filed a Petition, Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief and Motion and Affidavit in Support of Appointment of Counsel, on or about the
2nJ day of August, 2011, alleging, among other things, that there existed newly discovered
evidence that would justify post conviction relief in this matter. ( R. p. 1-25.)
The State ofidaho, by and through its attorney, Lance D. Stevenson, filed an
Answer on or about August 17, 2011. (R. pp. 26-29.) The Court issued an Order
Appointing Public Defender on or about August 29, 2011. (R. p. 30.)
On or about September l 4, 2011, the State filed a Motion for summary Dismissal
of Post-Conviction Petition and Brief in Support. (R. pp. 31-41.) Schultz filed an
Objection to State's Answer on or about September 21, 2011. (R. pp. 42-29.) On or
about September 23, 2011, the Court issued a Scheduling Order Regarding S tatc' s
Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R. pp. 46-46.)
Schultz filed a Motion to Vacate Underlying Criminal Conviction and Sentence
,....
L -

on or about September 28, 2011, and accompanying Affidavit of Counsel. (R. pp. 47-58.)
The State filed an Objection to Motion to Vacate Underlying Criminal Conviction and
Sentence on or about October 4, 2011. (R. pp. 59-61.) The State then filed an Objection
to Motion to Amend Successive Post-Conviction Brief on or about October 26, 20 l l. (R.
pp. 62-()5.)
A hearing was conducted on or about December 19, 2011, wherein counsel for
Schultz, Clayne Zollinger, was allowed to withdraw as attorney of record (R. p. 66 ), and
an Order Permitting Attorney to Withdraw was issued by the Court on or about December
19, 2011. (R. pp. 67-68.) An Order Appointing Public Defender was entered by the Court
on December 22, 2011, appointing Darnel S. Brown and Fuller Law Offices as attorneys
for Schultz. (R. p. 69.)
On or about January 20, 2012, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal was filed. (R. pp. 70-88.) Schultz filed Petitioner's
Motion for Summary Disposition on or about January 23, 2012. (R. pp. 90-91.) A
hearing was held on January 23, 2012, and Schultz was granted an additional thirty days
to file an amended petition. (R. pp 89, 92-93.)
Schultz filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Petitioner's
Amended Memorandum m Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on or
about February 21, 201

(R. pp. 94-157.) On or about February 22, 2012, Schultz filed

a Motion for an Order Determining that this Matter Proceed as a Class Action. (R. pp.
158-160.)
State filed an Answer to Amended Post Conviction Application on or about
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March 8, 2012. (R. pp. 161-163.) The State filed an Objection to Motion to Determine
that Matter Proceed as a Class Action and Motion to Dismiss on or about March 26,
2012. (R. pp. 164-176.)
On or about March 28, 2012, the State filed an Answer to Amended Successive
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (R. pp. 177-179.)
On or about June 19, 2012, the State filed an Affidavit of Matthew Garnette. (R.
pp. 181-183.)
Schultz filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Continue on or about the 22 11d day of June,
2012 (R. pp. 186-188) which was denied by the Court in an Order Denying Ex-Parte
Motion to Continue dated on or about June 22, 2012. (R. pp. 189-190.)
A hearing was conducted on or about June 25, 2012, relative to all pending
motions, and Exhibit A and Office of Professional Standards Administrative Investigation
Packet as Exhibit B were introduced as evidence. (R. pp 191-192.)
That the Court issued an Order Regarding All Pending Motions and Judgment of
Dismissal on or about the 11th day of July, 2012. (R. pp. 194-204.) On or about July 25,
2012, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 205-213.) The State filed an
Objection to Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 7, 2012. (R. pp. 214-216.)
On or about the l 0th day of August, 2012, the Court entered an Order Denying the
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 217-224.)
Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal on or about the 20th day of September, 2012. ( R.
pp.

.) The [daho Supreme Court issued an Order Remanding to District Court on

or about the 24th day of September, 2012. (R. p. 228.) The Court issued a Judgment on
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or about the 28th day of September, 2012. (R. p. 229.) Schultz then filed an Amended
Notice of Appeal on or about October 5, 2012. (R. pp. 230-233.)
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On or about August 3, 2006, Schultz was charged with Possession of a Controlled
Substance, as is set forth in Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka. Said case was set for trial at a later
date, which was vacated because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4,
2007. Schultz was persuaded to change his not-guilty plea to guilty as a result of plea
negotiations. Schultz' decision to change his plea was based partially on evidence which
was to be presented at trial, specifically, testimony by forensic scientist, Skyler D.
Anderson, relative to a lab report indicating that the controlled substance Schultz was
accused of being in possession of was methamphetamine. See a true and correct copy of
the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Crimmalistic Analysis Report Controlled
Substance Analysis and Affidavit ( R. pp. 130- l 3 l, 135-136) and the State's Supplemental
Witness List (R. pp. 133-134.) Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a
unified sentence of five (5) years, which unified sentence was comprised of a minimum
(fixed) period of confinement of five (5) years, followed by an indeterminate period of
custody of 0 years. Schultz received credit for time served in the amount of 37() days.
(R. pp. 118-1

Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003,
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certain improprieties occurred in at least one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp.
9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark
Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab
Improvement Manager, Matthew Garnette, regarding Skyler Anderson. Garnette
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of
controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing.
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection
of this practice. Mr. Anderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four (4)
occasions. (R. p. 138.) (Please refer to the Idaho State Police Office of Professional
Standards Administrative Investigation Report, OPS Case Number OP 2011-003, pages 1
through 19 contained in Exhibit "B''.)
Based on this information, Schultz filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post
Conviction Relief on or about the 2 11 J day of August, 2011, alleging, among other things,
that there existed newly discovered evidence that would justify post conviction relief in
this matter. (R. pp. 1-25.)
It is Schultz's position that because of the actions of the above-described
employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory m this case, he was prohibited
from utilizing a defense in his case that might otherwise be available to him. Specifically,
Schultz was prohibited from engaging m appropriate cross-examination of Skyler
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and

-6-

procedures in order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for
truthfulness, all in violation of Schultz' Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right to
confront all of witnesses against him.
In addition, it is Schultz' position that the information obtained from the Idaho
State Police is exculpatory in nature due to the fact that the in formation could be used to
impeach Skylar Anderson to such an extent that his analysis of the controlled substance
would not be accepted in the scientific community.

-7-

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

( 1) Whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz' Post
Conviction Petition.
(2) Whether or not the District Court erred m denying Schultz' :Vlotion for
Reconsideration.

-8

ARGUl\IENT
(1) ·whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz'

Post Conviction Petition.
First of all, there is no doubt that information that was favorable to the defense
was withheld and suppressed (whether inadvertently or not), thereby creating a

Brady/Giglio scenario. In this regard, consideration of the law set-out in

S. v. Kohring,

637 F.3d 895 (9 1h Cir. 201 l) is particularly relevant to the circumstances in the instant
case. In the Kohring case, Kohring was tried and convicted of Conspiracy to Commit
Extortion, Attempted Extortion, and Bribery, based largely upon the testimony of a
witness who had testified against him at trial. After conviction, and through post
conviction procedures, it was discovered that certain evidence concerning sexual
misconduct on the part of the witness had been withheld. In subsequent proceedings, this
information was determined to be relevant, particularly with respect to his characterfor

truthfitlness. [emphasis added.] The Court in its analysis stated the following:
In Brady, the Supreme Comt held "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1994.
In Giglio, the Supreme Court extended this principle to include evidence
that impeaches a witness's credibility. 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763.
There are three elements of a Brcu(y/Giglio violation: "(l) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by
the State, either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have
ensued." United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1887, 1202 (9 1h Cir. 2008)
v.
527 U.S. 263, 281
119 S.Ct. 1936, I
(quoting
L.Ed.2d 286 ( 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Evidence is prejudicial or material '"only if there is a reasonable

9-

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagiev,
473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). There 1s a
"reasonable probability" of prejudice when suppression of evidence
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'' Kyles v. Whitle.v, 514
U.S.419,434, 115S.Ct.1555, 131 L.Ed.2d490(1995)(citingBagley,
473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). But a ''reasonable probability" may be
found "even where the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to
convict the defendant." Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1071 (citing Strickler, 527
U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 ).
Suppressed evidence is considered ''collectively, not item by item." Kr/es,
514 U.S. At 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. If a reviewing court finds a material
Brmzv!Giglio violation, "there is no need for further harmless-error
review." Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. But if suppressed evidence is
"merely cumulative," then the failure to disclose is not a violation. Morris
v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9[ 11 Cir. 2006).
[emphasis added.]
Of course, Schultz realizes that while Brady certainly applies under the
circumstances described above, it is also necessary for Schultz to show materiality. The
law in this regard is sufficiently set out in In Re Brown, l 7 Cal.4th 873 ( 1998), wherein
the Court states as follows:
The current standard of review for Brady materiality was first aiiiculated
in Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. 667, although the United States Supreme Court
began developing it in earlier decisions. (See Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p.
112 [96 S.Ct. At pp. 2401-2402]; Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S.
atp. 154 [92 S.Ct. Atp. 766].) Recentlyin/\)·/es, supra, 514 U.S. 419,
the Court reemphasized four aspects articulated in Bagley critical to proper
analysis of Brady error. First, "[a]lthough the constitutional duty is
triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence, a
showmg of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance
that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately
in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable
doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate
the defendant). [Citations.] Bagley 's touchstone of materiality is a
"reasonable probability' of a different result, and the adjective is
important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely
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than not have received a different verdict \Vith the evidence, but whether in
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting 111 a
verdict worthy of confidence." (Id. at p. 434 [ 115 S.Ct. At pp. l 5(>51566].)
Second, ·•it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the
undisclosed evidence, there \vould not have been enough left to convict.
The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an
insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a Brady
violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should
have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict." (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 434435 [115 S.Ct. Atp. 1566], fn. Omitted.)
Third, ''once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional
error there is no need for fm1hcr harmless-error review." (Kyles. supra.
514 U.S. at p. 435 [115 S.Ct. At p. 1566].) The one subsumes the other.
(Id. at pp. 435-436 [115 S.Ct. At pp. 1566-1567].)
Fourth, while the tendency and force of undisclosed evidence is evaluated
item by item, its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality mut be
considered collectively. (Id. at pp. 436-437 & fn. 10 [115 S.Ct. At p. 157];
see also Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112 [96 S.Ct. At p. 2402}, fn. omitted
[omission "must be evaluated in the contest of the entire record"].)
In Bagley, the court identified another relevant consideration in noting that
''an incomplete response to a specific [Brac~v] request not only deprives
the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to
the defense that the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this misleading
representation, the defense might abandon lines of independent
investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it otherwise would have
pursued." (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682 [105 S.Ct. At p. 3384].)
Given this possibility, "under the ['reasonable probability'] formulation
the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the
prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or
presentation of the defendant's case. The reviewing court should assess
the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality
of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the
trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's
incomplete response." (Id. at p. 683 [105 S.Ct. At p. 3384]; see,
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Payne, supra, 63 F.3d at p. 1209.)
The expert in the principle case never actually testified, because, of course,
Schultz was not at that time aware of said expert's lack of credibility. The question is,
what would the jury have done if there had been a trial and the expert had been crossexamined relative to this new evidence'? In this regard, the Court in United ,)'wtes

E~r

Rel.

Ordog v. Yeager, 299 F.Supp. 321, cites to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Delli,
352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294 (1957) ...
"[h]ow can anyone in retrospect know ... how the jury's mind would have
operated if powerfully improper evidence had not in effect been put in the
scale against petitioner?" (352 U.S. 248, 77 S.Ct. 303, 1 L.Ed.2d 278)
How can anyone reasonably ascertain upon just what evidence the jury
relied, proper or incompetent or prejudicial, in determining their verdict?
It is submitted that no reasonable man can answer any of these queries 111
the affirmative.
Likewise, how in the principle case can anyone in retrospect know how the jury's
mind would have operated if they had known of the expert's deceitful acts in hiding his
violation of the policies and procedures of the Idaho State lab for the last eight years?
WHEREFORE, Schultz requests that the Court grant relief to which Schultz may
be entitled in this proceeding, including, but not limited to, setting aside the Judgment of
Conviction.

(2) 'Whether or not the District Court erred in denving Schultz'
'.\!lotion for Reconsideration.
It is

that the District Court determmed that
impeachment

not exculpatory

evidence presented

the

"(R. pp. 217-224.) Given

Court's finding, this Court should fully mvoke the doctrme set forth in Gardner and
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make a <lctem1ination as to whether or not Schultz would have insisted on going to trial
given the persuasiveness of the withheld infomrntion.
The District Court in its Order state<l that "Impeachment evidence "is special in
relation to thefairness ofa trial not in respect to vvhether a plea is voluntarv.'' Dunlap v.
State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) {quoting United States v. Rui::., 536
U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (emphasis in original). It should be noted that Dunlap goes on to
state
"[i]mpeachment evidence should be viewed in the same manner as
exculpatory evidence." Id., citing United States v. Bagley, 4 73 U.S. 66 7,
676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985); Pizzuto v. State,
134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3<l 742, 745 (2000).
As the District Court has previously noted, " ... the United States Constitution does
not require the State to disclose material impeachment infonnation prior to entering a
plea agreement with the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, ()33, 122
S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002)."
However, in State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 885 P.2d 1144 (App. 1994), the
Court stated as follows:
The State also contends that a defendant is entitled to assert a Bradv
violation only if the defendant's conviction followed a trial and not if the
defendant pleaded guilty. This argument is misplaced, for this Court has
previously held that grounds for withdrawal of a guilty plea were shown
where material, exculpatory evidence known to the State had been
withheld from the defendant. 5"tate v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 816 P.2d
364 (Ct.App. 1991 ).[fn6] Although the United States Supreme Court's
decisions have articulated the prosecutor's disclosure obligation as one
essential to ensure a fair trial, Bradv,
U.S. at
S.Ct. at l I 961197; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400, the underlying policy
expressed by these opinions
to uncover truth and ensure that only the
'lty are convicted
applies as well where a guilty plea was entered in
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ignorance of material, exculpatory information possessed by the
prosecution. In Baglev, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of
the Brady rule is "to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur,"
Baglev, 473 U.S. at 675, l 05 S.Ct. at 3379-3380, and in Agurs, the Court
stated:
[T]hough the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the
accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be
faithful to his client's overriding interest that "justice shall
be done." He is the "servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
,/gurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at 2401, quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). As to the
risk of conviction of the innocent by guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has
stated, "This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the
court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against
unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by
plea or by trial." Brac~v v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758, 90 S.Ct. 1463,
1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (l 970).[fn7] In light of these pronouncements of the
Supreme Court, we see no reason to depart from our decision in Johnson,
which allows relief for violations of the prosecutorial obligation of
disclosure in appropriate circumstances where the conviction was entered
upon a guilty plea.

The validity of a guilty plea is determined by reference to whether it was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Brcu~v v. United States, 397 U.S. at
748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468-1469; Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 398, 787 P.2d at 284;
State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 558, 835 P.2d 1366, 1369. This entails an
inquiry as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront adverse witnesses and to refrain from self-incrimination; and
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284. Thus, to satisfy
constitutional standards, a guilty plea must not only be voluntary but must
be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." Bnuzv v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at
1469. It also must not be a product of "misrepresentation or other
impermissible conduct by state agents." Id., 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at
14 73. Where misconduct by the state keeps a defendant and his attorney
unaware of circumstances tending to negate the defendant's guilt or to
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reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of those facts may
not be knowing and intelligent though it is otherwise voluntary.
Accordingly, a Bradv v. Maryland violation may \Varrant setting aside a
guilty plea where the violation calls into question the accuracy of the
adjudication of guilt.

In the vast majority of cases, when defendants plead guilty they know full
well whether they in fact committed the offense. If information withheld
by the State relates to a fact that was within the defendant's knowledge and
that he admitted when the plea was entered, the discovery of a Bradv
violation ought not enable the defendant to contest that which he has
already openly admitted. In such circumstances, a violation of the
prosecution's obligation of disclosure does not compromise the truth or
risk conviction of the innocent. Therefore, it is essential to detennine
\Vhether the defendant's admissions at the plea hearing fully established his
factual guilt.
The inquiry into the effect of the undisclosed evidence on the plea decision
as discussed in White is essentially the same as an assessment of the
materiality of the evidence. The Brcu(v principle is violated only if the
evidence withheld by the state is both exculpatory and material. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (l 985); Agurs, 427 U.S. at
107-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2402; Brw(v, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 11961197. "Materiality" for purposes of evaluating a claimed Brady violation is
defined in Bagley:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682, l 05 S.Ct. at 3383.
On a Bradv challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether
there is a reasonable probability that but for the state's failure to produce
the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but mstead
\Vot!ld
insisted on
to
/vfiller v. Angliker,
F.2d
1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation mto what
particular defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but
an objective assessment, based m part upon the persuasiveness of the
withheld mfom1ation. Id.
also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 1
S.Ct. at 370-371.

-
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Schultz would invoke the doctrine set forth in Gardner and ask the Court to
determme whether or not there is a reasonable probability, but for the State's failure to
produce the information, Schultz would not have entered the plea but mstead would have
insisted on going to trial. This is an objective assessment, based in part upon the part of
the persuasiveness of the withheld information.
In Unired 5i'tates v. Rui::. 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the Court stated as follmvs:
When a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees. Boykin v. Alahama, 395 U.S.
238, 243 ( 1969) (pleading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincnmination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury). Given the seriousness of the matter, the Constitution
insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is "voluntary" and
that the defendant must make related waivers "knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 ( 1970); see also Bovkin, supra, at 242.
Schultz would assert that his plea of guilt was not knowing, voluntary and
mtelligent given the persuasiveness of the withheld information. Where misconduct by
the State keeps a defendant and his attorney unaware of circumstances tending to negate
the defendant's guilt or to reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of
those facts may not be knowing and intelligent, though it is otherwise voluntary.
Therefore, a Brw~y violation may warrant setting aside a guilty plea where the violation
calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt. Gardner at 434.
Further, Schultz specifically requests that this Court find that the evidence
introduced is exculpatory evidence. In

v. United States, the Court held that

"'exculpatory evidence includes "evidence affecting" witness "credibility," where the
witness' "reliability" is likely "detern1inative of guilt or innocence"". Giglio v. United
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States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 ( 1972). Giglio filed a motion for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence contending that the Government failed to disclose an
alleged promise of leniency made to its key witness in return for his testimony. At a
hearing on this motion, the Assistant United States Attorney who presented the case to
the grand jury admitted that he promised the witness that he would not be prosecuted if he
testified before the grand jury and at trial. The Assistant who tried the case was unaware
of the promise. The court held that the prosecution's duty to present all material evidence
to the jury was not fulfilled and constituted a violation of due process requiring a new
trial. Id.
Schultz contends that the evidence presented to the District Court is, in fact,
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. As set forth above, exculpatory
evidence includes impeachment evidence where the witness' reliability is likely
determinative of guilt or innocence.
Obviously, in any possession of controlled substances case, the forensic scientist'
testimony will determine guilt or innocence. Hypothetically speaking, upon an
examination of the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, a defendant could meet every single
element contained in those instructions for the charge of possession of controlled
substances, with the exception of the determination that the substance was, in fact, a
controlled substance, and not be guilty of the charge.

[t

is not sufficient to sustain a

conviction for possession of a controlled substance where the substance is not, in fact, a
controlled substance. The only witness that can satisfy this requirement is a forensic
scientist, duly qualified, who can reliably report test results. There can be no other
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Therefore, £his witness' testimony is determinative o{guilt or innocense.
f n addition, the evidence is exculpatory for several other reasons. First, according

to Daubert v. /<.Jerrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). the
testing procedures utilized in a criminal proceeding should be in a form that is commonly
accepted in the scientific community. As the Court is likely aware, analysis of controlled
substances utilizes the Scientific Method. The Scientific Method requires a "controlled"
environment. The evidence submitted at heanng clearly shows that a large quantity of
controlled substances which had been unaccounted was being stored in the roof tiles of
the laboratory. Given that there were no rules or regulations pertaining to the storage of
those drugs, nor their handling, it is entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory
was contaminated by the unaccounted for controlled substances. Further, the evidence
clearly demonstrates that there were no set procedures concerning the amount of
substance which was to be taken from each substance for testing purposes, there were no
rules or regulations concerning the destruction of samples, nor were the forensic analysts
being audited concerning their policies and procedures relating to the analysis of
controlled substances. It is apparent that there was not a controlled environment existing
at the time Schultz' drug sample was tested. The evidence introduced at hearing clearly
demonstrates that said evidence is both impeaching and exculpatory.
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CONCLUSION
Schultz would request that the Court make a determination as to whether or not
the evidence presented calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt.
Schultz \Vould also request that this Court declare the evidence introduced at hearmg to
be both impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.
As was stated by Colonel G. Jerry Russell, Director, Idaho State Police.

111

correspondence dated May 11, 2011, to Wilham Lloyd Mauk,
"Mr. Anderson was complicit over a period of years in deliberately hiding
a box of "show and tell" drugs kept at the ISP Forensic Lab in Pocatello. I
understand that this was part of the training he received from now fom1er
Region 5 lab employees, Don Wyckoff and Rockland McDowell, who
apparently justified to him as the box being kept as "reforence" matenals
that would cost money to order from supply companies. Mr. Anderson's
direct participation in the activity concerning this box appears to have
ended in 2008 when he was transferred to toxicology, at which point he
ceased having any direct connection to it. Arter reading an article that
Region 5 Lab Manager Shannon Larson sent to Mr. Anderson in 2011, and
knowing that the existence of the unauthorized box could have a negative
effect on the lab's accreditation, Mr. Anderson reported the existence of
the box to Ms. Larson. Until this disclosure to Ms. Larson, this box and
its contents were kept secreted and hidden from auditors. Mr. Anderson
himself hid this box and its contents on at least four occasions, and he
instructed at least one other lab employee to do the same.
As set forth in the Notice of contemplated Disciplinary Action dated April
27, 2011, there are very serious consequences of Mr. Anderson's actions
that I must consider. First, since he deliberately hid the box of "show and
tell" drugs from lab auditors, numerous times and over a period of years, I
have no choice but to view his actions as repeated purposeful deception.
Second, Mr. Anderson's actions may have caused serious damage to
Region 5 Lab's reputation, and may have even called into question the
accuracy and integrity of the entire lSP Forensic Lab program. Surely Mr.
Anderson appreciates the devastation to the Idaho criminal justice system
should that happen. Third, Mr. Anderson's actions could have an adverse
on Region S's lab accreditation. He should be acutely aware of this,
given that he is an ASCLD/LAB (American Society of Crime Laboratory
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Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board) auditor.
(Please see Exhibit "B".) It is difficult to imagine that had Schultz known of the findings
made by the Idaho State Police, that he would have entered a plea of guilty. Schultz
contends that he would have entered a plea of not gmlty, and would have taken the matter
to a trial before a jury of his peers.
Therefore, Schultz requests that his plea of guilt be withdrawn and/or set aside
and the conviction vacated. In the alternative, Schultz requests that this Court grant him a
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
DATED This 20th day of March, 2013.
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